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Most economists agree that the only proven way to 
fight inflation is with fiscal and monetary restraint. 
Still, an auxiliary weapon has recently been proposed 
and enthusiastically discussed as worth trying: a Tax-
based Incomes Policy (TIP). In its basic form, this 
policy levies a tax on wage increases and counts on 
lower wage increases turning into lower price in-
creases. Arthur Okun of the Brookings Institution 
and Henry Wallich of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System have urged adoption of their 
own versions of TIP in speeches and articles carried 
prominently in the media,
1 the Council of Economic 
Advisers discussed TIP plans in their 1978 annual re-
port,
2 the Ford Foundation gave the Brookings Insti-
tution $75,000 for a one-day seminar on TIP in April,
3 
and the Senate's Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs Committee held two days of hearings on TIP in 
May.
4 
In this article we examine the case for TIP and 
explain why this policy is the wrong way to fight infla-
tion. Looking closely at how TIP would affect the 
economy, we find that it would be counterproduc-
tive. 
A major flaw in TIP is its reliance on the stability 
of the relationship between wages and prices. TIP 
proponents argue that the relationship is so close that 
lower wage inflation turns directly into lower price in-
flation. Economic theory and empirical evidence 
show, however, that while wages and prices may be 
closely related in normal times, the relationship 
changes when government policies disrupt the wage 
process. With TIP, the relationship would change 
enough to actually result in higher prices with lower 
wages. 
Another big flaw in TIP is the side effects it 
would have. Contrary to what its proponents believe, 
TIP would cause all the distortionary and administra-
tive problems of other incomes policies; the differ-
ence between TIP and explicit wage controls is just a 
matter of degree. 
The Mechanics of TIP 
Although TIP has many variants, they all reduce to 
being a tax on wage increases. They would work 
something like this: Each year the government would 
announce a wage increase guidepost for the next 
calendar year. It would also announce a TIP tax 
schedule. At the end of the year firms would pay a tax 
according to the schedule if the wage increases they 
granted exceeded the government's guidepost; they 
would receive a subsidy (a negative tax) according to 
the schedule if the wage increases were below the 
guidepost. 
As an example, suppose the government an-
nounced a wage increase guidepost of 6 percent and a 
tax rate of 3 percent. That would mean that for each 
'Henry C. Wallich, "Stabilization Goals: Balancing Inflation and 
Unemployment,"American Economic Review, May 1978 (Papers and 
Proceedings of the Ninetieth Annual Meeting of the American Eco-
nomic Association, New York, December 28-30, 1977), pp. 159-164; 
Arthur M. Okun, "The Great Stagflation Swamp," Challenge, Novem-
ber-December 1977, pp. 6-13; Lindley H. Clark, Jr., "The Outlook: 
Review of Current Trends in Business and Finance," Wall Street 
Journal, February 6, 1978, p. 1; Gardner Ackley, "Okun s New Tax-
Based Incomes-Policy Proposal," Economic Outlook USA (Survey 
Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michi-
gan), Winter 1978, pp. 8-9; "Another Weapon Against Inflation: Tax 
Policy," Business Week, October 3, 1978, pp. 94, 96. 
2U.S., President, Economic Report of the President together with 
The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 151-2. 
3Thomas E. Mullaney, "$75,000, One-Day Seminar on Okun Plan 
for Inflation," New York Times, February 15, 1978, p. 53. 
4David Pauly and Rich Thomas, "TIP: A New Approach," News-
week, May 29, 1978, p. 76. 
9 percentage point of wage increase a firm granted 
over (or under) 6 percent, 3 percentage points would 
be added to (or subtracted from) its corporate profits 
tax rate. If a firm granted a 10 percent wage in-
crease—4 percentage points more than the guide-
post—the firm would have 12 percentage points (the 
4 excess points times the 3 percent tax rate) added to 
its profits tax rate (see illustration). If a firm actually 
granted a 6 percent wage increase, it would pay no tax 
and receive no subsidy. But if a firm granted a wage 
increase of, say, 4 percent, that would come under 
the 6 percent guidepost by 2 percentage points, so the 
firm would have 6 points (the 2 points short times the 
3 percent tax rate) subtracted from its profits tax rate 
(a subsidy). 
TIP, as presently described, could affect output 
and prices through two channels: 
1. It would change firms' employment costs since 
each dollar of wage increase would cost firms 
more than a dollar when the tax was included. 
2. It could change federal revenues and thus alter 
the federal deficit. 
TIP proponents have proposed that the tax rate and 
guidepost be set so that the taxes and subsidies bal-
Here's how TIP could affect a corporation's profits 
and employment costs. 
Effect of a 6 percent TIP guidepost and a 3 percent TIP tax for each 
percentage point of wage increase over the guidepost 
Before 
wage increase 
After 10 percent wage increase 
Without TIP With TIP 
Profits before taxes 
and salary expenses  $2,000,000  $2,000,000  $2,000,000 
LESS salary expenses  -1,000,000  -1,100,000  -1,100,000 
EQUALS profits before taxes  $1,000,000  $ 900,000  $ 900,000 
Corporate profits tax rate  50%  50%  50% 
PLUS TIP surcharge  —  - + 12* 
EQUALS effective profits tax rate  50%  50%  62% 
LESS profits taxes 
(profits before taxes X tax rate) 
500,000  450,000  558,000 
EQUALS profits after taxes  $ 500,000  $ 450,000  $ 342,000 
Total employment costs 
(salary expenses + 
TIP surcharge) 
$1,000,000  $1,100,000  $1,208,000 
•Computation of TIP surcharge: Wage increase of 10 percent — 6 percent guidepost = 4 excess percentage points 
4X3 percent tax rate = 12 percentage points surcharge 
(.12 X $900,000 = $108,000) 
10  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Spring 1978 ance out.
5 TIP is intended, then, to have no direct ef-
fect on the federal deficit.
6 
The goal of TIP is to reduce inflation at given 
levels of employment. According to Wallich and 
Sidney Weintraub: 
The twin goals of price level stability and full 
employment have so far eluded conventional 
monetary and fiscal techniques .... [TIP] is 
conceived as a supplement to the familiar 
monetary-fiscal policies so that the economy 
might operate closer to full employment 
without the inflationary danger of excess de-
mand and "overheating."
7 
Two features of TIP distinguish it from previous-
ly implemented incomes policies. 
First, although the goal of TIP, like that of all in-
comes policies, is to slow the rate of price inflation, 
TIP would act directly only on wage inflation. Previ-
ous incomes policies have coupled wage constraints 
with price constraints. Thus, TIP's effectiveness re-
lies on the closeness and stability of the actual rela-
tionship between wage increases and price increases. 
The other and perhaps most novel feature of TIP 
is that it would allow wage increases in excess of the 
government's guidepost; it would, however, penalize 
excessive wage settlements with a tax. Business and 
labor would still be free to reach their own bargains, 
though the costs of settling could be different for 
firms under TIP. Wage constraints applied in the past 
have treated guideposts as ceilings and prohibited 
wage settlements above them. In this respect TIP is 
intended to be less repressive and more reliant on 
market forces than previous wage constraint policies. 
The Case for TIP 
Arguments in favor of incomes policies generally 
reduce to the claim that they improve the Phillips 
curve relationship between inflation and unemploy-
ment—at least in the short run. That is, they allow at 
least temporarily a lower inflation rate at any given 
rate of unemployment. Indeed, Wallich and Wein-
traub state: 
An incomes policy projects a direct attack 
[on wage and price increases] and can thus 
improve such a tradeoff between inflation 
and unemployment as may exist in the short 
run.
8 
The claim that TIP will improve the tradeoff 
between unemployment and inflation is built on three 
arguments: 
1. TIP will lower the rate of wage inflation. 
According to its proponents, TIP will do this by 
stiffening employers' resistance to labor's wage de-
mands. Since TIP makes larger wage settlements 
even more expensive to employers, they will be more 
willing to hold out for smaller settlements. 
2. Lower wage inflation resulting from TIP will be 
translated directly into lower price inflation. 
This argument is based on one observation and 
one claim. The observation is that for the economy as 
a whole, prices tend to be a constant markup of unit 
labor costs (the total wage bill divided by total out-
put). A constant markup implies that the rate of 
growth in prices is equal to the rate of growth in 
wages less the rate of growth in output per hours 
worked (productivity). The claim is that while pro-
ductivity growth may vary due to cyclical factors 
such as employment and structural factors such as 
technological innovation, it will not be affected by 
the introduction of an incomes policy such as TIP. 
Since TIP will not affect productivity growth, it will, 
according to the growth rate relationship, lower the 
rate of price inflation by the same amount that it 
lowers the rate of wage inflation. 
While TIP proponents' first two arguments build 
a case why TIP will reduce the rate of inflation, they 
do not imply by themselves that TIP will improve the 
existing tradeoff between unemployment and infla-
tion. It is logically possible that TIP will lower infla-
tion by creating more unemployment and so result in 
5Business Week, p. 94. 
6One version of TIP would tax wage increases above the guidepost 
but would not subsidize increases below it (the "stick" approach), while 
another version would subsidize but would not tax (the "carrot" ap-
proach). Each version is a special case of the policy examined in the 
text. Each one would increase the cost of hiring an extra unit of 
labor—the stick version due to the increase in tax, the carrot version 
due to the decrease in subsidy. The actions needed to neutralize the 
effect of TIP on the federal budget, however, would be different for the 
two versions. 
7Henry C. Wallich and Sidney Weintraub, "A Tax-based Incomes 
Policy," Journal of Economic Issues, June 1971, p. 1. 
NWallich and Weintraub, p. 2. 
li a different outcome along the Phillips curve rather 
than in shifting the curve. That is why TIP propo-
nents must add a third argument to their case. 
3. TIP will have only minor effects on output and 
employment. 
Proponents include these points in their case: 
First, since wages and prices will be free to adjust to 
market forces under TIP, the program will introduce 
very few economic distortions and inefficiencies. 
Second, most versions of TIP couple it to the corpo-
rate profits tax which is considered to be a nondistor-
tionary tax. That is, the corporate profits tax is not 
supposed to alter the profit-maximizing level of a 
firm's output, and proponents argue TIP won't either. 
Finally, since TIP will be a surcharge on the corpo-
rate profits tax, it will be easy to enforce. The IRS 
can police TIP with little increase in staff, so unlike 
previously implemented incomes policies, a huge bu-
reaucracy draining resources from the private econo-
my need not arise. 
Our Case Against TIP 
We believe TIP proponents are right that TIP would 
slow wage inflation but wrong in their other conten-
tions: lower wages under TIP would translate into 
higher, not lower prices, and TIP could have large 
effects on output and employment. To reach those 
conclusions, we first consider how TIP changes the 
employment, pricing, and output decisions of a typi-
cal firm. We find that TIP acts as a tax on labor. We 
then expand this analysis to the overall economy. 
Our representative firm is assumed to have some 
power to determine wages and set prices; that seems 
consistent with what TIP proponents have in mind 
when they say firms are able to bargain for lower 
wages and mark up prices based on costs. The firm 
can produce one good with various combinations of 
capital and labor. It can employ all the capital it 
wants at a fixed per unit rental rate, but it can add 
more workers only by paying a higher wage rate.
9 It 
can sell more of its product only by lowering the 
price. 
Without TIP the firm maximizes its profits by 
producing up to the point where the extra revenue 
from one more unit of output exactly equals the extra 
cost of producing that unit. Similarly, the firm em-
ploys each input up to the point where the extra 
revenue from the resulting increased production ex-
actly equals the cost of that additional input unit. The 
extra revenue generated by one more unit of either 
input is essentially the increase in revenue from sell-
ing more output at the original price less the decline 
in revenue from selling the original output at a lower 
price. The cost of an extra unit of capital is the per 
unit rental rate; the cost of an additional unit of labor 
is essentially the wage paid for the extra unit plus the 
increase in the wage bill resulting from the higher 
wage required to attract the extra labor. When the 
firm maximizes its profits, the change in revenue 
generated by a minute increase or decrease in labor 
or capital is exactly offset by a change in costs, leav-
ing its profits unchanged. 
Now let us suppose TIP is introduced as a sur-
charge on the corporate profits tax, as in the earlier 
illustration. Without loss in generality, we assume 
that the TIP guidepost is set equal to the wage in-
crease the firm would have paid without TIP. The 
question is whether TIP changes any of the firm's 
hiring, pricing, or output decisions. 
TIP doesn't change some things. It doesn't 
change the extra revenues generated by additional 
units of capital or labor. Those relationships depend 
on how much output is produced with an extra unit of 
either input, on how much revenue is increased by 
selling the extra output at the original price, and on 
how much revenue is reduced due to lowering the 
price to sell the extra output. And the cost of an extra 
unit of capital is still its per unit rental rate. 
TIP does, however, change some things. The 
cost of adding one more unit of labor is now higher. 
Besides the original cost, the firm will have to pay the 
TIP tax, because to hire another worker the firm will 
have to pay a wage above the guidepost. Thus, at the 
original profit-maximizing position adding another 
worker under TIP raises costs more than revenues 
and therefore decreases profits. But if at that same 
position the firm hires one less unit of labor instead, 
its costs decline more than before. That is because 
the firm can pay a lower wage to attract less labor, 
allowing its wage to come in under the guidepost and 
9If we had assumed that the firm could hire all the workers it wanted 
at a given wage rate, TIP would be irrelevant. The extent to which the 
market wage rate exceeded or fell short of the guidepost would raise or 
lower the firm's corporate profits tax rate, but it would not affect the 
cost of hiring an additional worker. 
12  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Spring 1978 entitling it to a subsidy. Thus, at the original profit-
maximizing position the decline in costs from hiring 
one less unit of labor is more than the decline in reve-
nues and therefore increases profits. 
So TIP will cause the firm to change its hiring, 
pricing, and output policies: The firm will hire less 
labor and offer a lower wage, and it will increase its 
ratio of capital to labor. It will offer fewer goods on 
the market due to the reduction in labor and thus will 
charge a higher price for its product. With the guide-
post set at its original wage offer, the firm's profits will 
increase as a result of the TIP subsidy. 
Not only will TIP change the firm's decisions in a 
given economic environment, it also will change the 
firm's responses to a changing environment. Normal-
ly, the firm will increase its labor force and its output 
when demand for its product increases or when its 
production process improves to make labor more 
productive. But with TIP the cost of adding labor 
rises more steeply than before, so that the firm will re-
spond less to such changing conditions: it will hire 
fewer extra workers and increase production more 
modestly than without TIP. 
So even though TIP is a tax on profits, it still 
affects a firm's employment, output, and pricing deci-
sions. In fact, its effects are precisely those of an 
excise tax on labor. The economy-wide effects of 
TIP, therefore, will be similar to those of any excise 
tax—and quite different from what TIP proponents 
claim. 
1. TIP will lower wages, as proponents say. 
An excise tax lowers the demand for the good 
being taxed—in this case, labor—and results in a 
lower price net of the tax—in this case, the wage. 
2. But TIP will raise prices, not lower them, as 
intended. 
The average price level in the economy is deter-
mined by aggregate demand and aggregate supply, 
the schedules of all goods demanded and offered at 
given prices. As a first approximation, an excise tax 
affects aggregate demand only to the extent that it 
changes government tax receipts. Since we are as-
suming, as TIP proponents have proposed, that the 
taxes and subsidies balance under TIP, we conclude 
that TIP will not change aggregate demand. 
TIP will, however, reduce aggregate supply. Just 
as with other excise taxes, TIP will result in a lower 
demand for and a lower supply of the good being 
taxed. Here, the good is labor, and as we have seen, 
TIP raises the cost of hiring more workers and re-
duces firms' demand for them. Faced with lower 
wages, more workers will substitute leisure for labor, 
thus lowering the amount of labor supplied. With less 
total employment and a given stock of capital, then, 
firms altogether will produce less; that is, the aggre-
gate supply of goods will fall. 
Since TIP will not change aggregate demand but 
will reduce aggregate supply, it will increase the aver-
age price level. This means that TIP will change the 
normally stable relationship between average wages 
and average prices, the relationship TIP proponents 
count on to make TIP an effective inflation fighter. 
Because of the TIP tax "wedge" between what em-
ployers have to pay for labor and what workers re-
ceive, prices will no longer be the same constant 
markup of wages. 
Standard economic theory suggests that any gov-
ernment policy which alters the wage process will 
also affect the relationship of prices to wages for a 
price-setting firm. In his careful study of firm decision 
making, John Geweke found that: 
. . .it cannot be inferred that since prices of 
manufactured goods are a markup on wage 
and raw materials prices, only the latter need 
be the target of any wage and price control 
program .... It is... likely that the form and 
very existence of the price equation are sen-
sitive to any major change in policy.
1
0 
Historical evidence supports this contention— 
and not the case for TIP. Geweke's study sharply re-
jected the hypothesis that the relationship between 
wages and prices was the same during either of the 




our study of the early 1970s controls yields similar re-
sults: Before and after the last controls, prices were 
closely related to unit labor costs. However, this rela-
tionship does not imply a one-for-one pass-through 
I0John Geweke, "Wage and Price Dynamics in U.S. Manufactur-
ing," New Methods in Business Cycle Research: Proceedings from a 
Conference (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1977), 
p. 133. 
"Geweke, pp. 128-9. 
13 from wages to prices. And more importantly, the rela-




 Controls seem to have 
initially lowered inflation by lowering the price mark-
up and, hence, profit margins. Both the markup and 
margins quickly recovered after the policies were 
removed. 
3. TIP's effects on output and employment can be 
significant. 
TIP proponents argue that wages can adjust bet-
ter to market forces under TIP than under explicit 
wage controls, so TIP will produce relatively few 
market distortions and inefficiencies. But the easier it 
is for wages to adjust under TIP (the lower the TIP 
tax rate), the less effective TIP will be in controlling 
wage inflation. The more effective TIP is in control-
ling wage inflation, therefore, the less wages will be 
able to adjust to changing economic conditions, and 
the effects on output and employment can be very 
great. 
Also contrary to what its proponents believe, TIP 
will divert resources from productive use to the main-
tenance of a costly bureaucracy. All the administra-
tive problems normally attributed to controls also 
occur to some degree with excise taxes. That is be-
cause an excise tax and a control are not substantive-
ly different; they are different only in degree: the size 
of the tax rate. With a high enough TIP tax rate on 
wages, for instance, no firm can afford to pay a wage 
above the guidepost, so that the guidepost becomes a 
wage ceiling. And the higher the TIP tax rate, the 
more severe the administrative problems will be. As 
the tax rate climbs, people will have more incentive 
to evade TIP, so maintaining voluntary compliance 
will be harder. And as with all taxes, defining the tax 
base will not be easy. 
Our last bout with wage controls required 82 




some of the questions likely to arise with TIP: 
Definitions 
1. Since TIP is attached to the corporate profits tax, 
how will it be applied to unincorporated busi-
nesses and nonprofit institutions? 
2. How will TIP be applied to new firms with no past 
records of salary expenses? 
3. How will "the wage" be defined? Wallich and 
Weintraub suggest that a wage be computed for 
each firm by totaling wage and salary payments 
in each job classification and grade, dividing by 
the number of hours worked in the respective 




 This definition does not resolve many 
problems: 
• How will firms be kept from evading TIP by 
granting promotions? If firms promote people 
receiving above-guidepost wage increases, 
their wage indices could grow less than the 
guidepost although all individual increases are 
above it. 
• How will dollar values be attached to in-
creased payments in kind, like more liberal use 
of company cars or longer work breaks and 
vacations? 
• How will TIP be applied to payments for work 
contracted out to self-employed people? 
Special Cases 
1. Will TIP be applied retroactively to previously 
negotiated wage increases? 
2. Will TIP allow wage catch-ups to preserve wage 
structure? Coal miners, for instance, settled for a 
reported 37 percent wage and benefit increase 
over three years; should not other miners be 
allowed to receive similar increases? 
3. Will TIP allow wage increases in excess of the 
l2We estimated a quarterly regression of consumer prices of all items 
except food against ten past and four future lags of unit labor costs in 
the private nonfarm sector. In the period 1953.1 through 1971.2 the re-
lationship appears close with an adjusted R
2 of .87. However, the 
coefficients on future lags are significant and indicate there is feedback 
running from prices to unit labor costs. Hence, ordinary least squares 
regressions of prices on current and past values of unit labor costs will 
have biased coefficients and will not give reliable estimates of how 
prices change to a change in wages. Moreover, our study, like 
Geweke's, very strongly rejects the hypothesis that the relationship of 
prices to unit labor costs remained stable after the imposition of 
controls in 1971. 
I3U.S., General Services Administration, Office of the Federal 
Register, Code of Federal Regulations: Economic Stabilization, re-
vised as of October 1, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1972). 
14Wallich and Weintraub, p. 14. 
14  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Spring 1978 guidepost if they are needed to satisfy govern-
ment regulations? It is conceivable that to com-
ply with an OSHA regulation, for example, a firm 
will have to hire some high-priced labor which 
will cause the increase in its wage bill to exceed 
the guidepost. Should the firm also have to pay 
the TIP tax as a penalty? 
What if TIP taxed price increases too? 
TIP is obviously the wrong way to fight inflation. 
While it could hold down wages, it would boost prices 
and cause a lot of economic distortions and adminis-
trative problems. 
Possibly in response to criticisms like these, 




 But this would make TIP not 
essentially different from past wage and price control 
policies. The difference once again would be just a 
matter of degree, the size of the TIP tax rate. And 
many economists have pointed out that although 
wage and price control policies have been used 
against inflation in many countries at many times in 
history, they have never worked for long. Though 
they may temporarily hold down price increases, 
once they are removed the distortions they have 




Why, then, do governments continue to resort to 
incomes policies? 
The answers usually given to this question are 
either that governments do not learn from history or 
that people can be fooled into believing that their 
governments are attempting to do something about 
inflation. Maybe these answers are right, but they do 
not attribute much intelligence to governments or 
their citizens. 
Our answer is that governments use incomes poli-
cies as a form of taxation. Just as income taxes and 
inflation transfer resources from the private sector to 
the public sector, so too do wage and price controls. 
With controls, the government takes the resources it 
wants and then does not let people buy all the goods 
and services they want at market prices. By not allow-
ing people to spend all they want at given prices, 
controls can be considered a kind of tax on money 
holdings. 
Some form of taxation is necessary to pay for 
most government expenditures, of course, and gov-
ernments use a variety of them—income taxes, sales 
and excise taxes, property taxes, inflation. This is be-
cause any single tax creates economic distortions 
which grow increasingly severe as the tax grows in 
size. 
Any incomes policy creates distortions too, and 
these distortions become severe very quickly. When 
government expenditures outstrip revenues which can 
be comfortably raised through existing taxes and in-
flation, wage and price controls may for a time be no 
worse a way to transfer resources to the government 
than greater reliance on normal channels. But ex-
perience has shown that before long controls disrupt 
our market economy so much that they have to be 
lifted. 
Incomes policies, therefore, are very expensive 
as both a tax and an inflation fighter, and we should 
be wary of using them. Except in very unusual situa-
tions, the government should rely on normal ways to 
get resources. And it should use the only proven way 
to control inflation: sound monetary and fiscal poli-
cies. 
15WaIlich, p. 164. 
16See the preceding article in this Quarterly Review. 
15 